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MANDATORY DISCLOSURE AND INDIVIDUAL
INVESTORS: EVIDENCE FROM THE JOBS ACT
COLLEEN HONIGSBERG
ROBERT J. JACKSON, JR.
YU-TING FORESTER WONG*
ABSTRACT

One prominent justification for the mandatory disclosure rules that
define modem securities law is that these rules encourage individual
investors to participatein stock markets. Mandatory disclosure, the theory
goes, gives individual investors access to information that puts them on a
more equal playing field with sophisticated institutional shareholders.
Although this reasoning has long been cited by regulators and
commentators as a basis for mandating disclosure, recent work has
questioned its validity. In particular,recent studies contend that individual
investors are overwhelmed by the amount of information required to be
disclosed under current law, and thus they cannot and do not use that
information to analyze the companies that they own.
Using a recent change in the law that allows firms to disclose less
information before their initial public offering ("IPO"), we examine
whether reduced disclosure leads to less trading by individual investors.
Our results show that, immediatelyfollowing the IPO, individual investors
are less likely to trade in the stocks of the firms that provide less
disclosure but that this difference disappearsafter two weeks of trading.
Our findings have important implications for the lawmakers now
examining whether, and how, to change the mandatory disclosure rules
that have served as the basis offederal securities lawfor generations.

* Colleen Honigsberg and Yu-Ting Forester Wong are Ph.D. Candidates at Columbia Business
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MANDATORY DISCLOSURE AND INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS

INTRODUCTION

Mandatory disclosure is the cornerstone of federal securities law. 1 One
oft-cited justification for requiring disclosure 2 is that it is necessary to
provide individual investors with equal access to securities markets. 3 But
whether the mandatory disclosure rules we have today actually achieve
this goal is theoretically ambiguous and hotly debated. Some argue that
disclosure facilitates individual investor participation in securities markets
by reducing information asymmetry among different types of investorsthat is, by leveling the playing field between sophisticated institutional
shareholders and invididual investors. 4 More recent work, however, has
suggested that individual investors suffer from "disclosure overload"-and
that increasing the amount of information disclosed under federal
securities law does not benefit these investors, who are unable to extract
relevant information from increasingly complicated securities filings. 5 But

1. The Securities Act of 1933 requires that all companies register non-exempt securities prior to
their sale, a process that requires the company to disclose significant information about its financial
performance and governance for the years preceding the sale. After the firm has provided this
information and sells its securities, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 then requires ongoing,
periodic disclosures relating to the firm's financial performance and governance. See generally
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-mm (2014); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-pp (2014).
2. For the seminal work describing the economic basis for a system of mandatory disclosure,
see John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System,

70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984).
3. See, e.g., Michael H. Sutton, Financial Reporting in U.S. Capital Markets: International
Dimensions, 11 ACCT.HORIZONS 96 (1997).

4. See, e.g., Brian J. Bushee et al., Open Versus Closed Conference Calls: The Determinants
and Effects of Broadening Access to Disclosure, 34 J. ACCT. & ECON. 149 (2003); Bevis Longstreth,

Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch.Comm'n, Remarks to the Eighth AICPA National Conference for CPAs in
Industry: The SEC's Role in Financial Disclosure (Apr. 29, 1983), available at https://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/1983/042983longstreth.pdf.
5. See, e.g., Alastair Lawrence, Individual Investors and Financial Disclosure, 56 J. ACCT. &

ECON. 130 (2013) (showing that individuals are more likely to invest in, and to earn higher returns
from, firms with clearer and more concise disclosures); Brian P. Miller, The Effects of Reporting
Complexity on Small and Large Investor Trading, 85 ACCT. REV. 2107 (2010) (finding that individuals
are less likely to trade in companies with complex disclosures). In light of these concerns about
"disclosure overload," in 2013, the US Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") issued a lengthy
report reviewing the effectiveness of mandatory disclosure rules in the United States. U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT ON REVIEW OF DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN REGULATION S-K (2013)

[hereinafter SEC REPORT]. And the SEC has since announced a rulemaking project to reform the rules
governing mandatory disclosures for US public firms, see Keith F. Higgins, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin.,
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Disclosure Effectiveness: Remarks Before the American Bar Association
Business Law Section Spring Meeting (Apr. 11, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/
Detail/Speech/1370541479332, and issued a concept release raising more than 300 questions regarding
how any such reform should proceed, see Concept Release on Business and Financial Disclosure
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there is surprisingly little empirical evidence on whether and how the
quantum of information required to be disclosed under federal securities6
law actually affects individual investor participation in securities markets.
In this Article, we provide evidence on the effects of disclosure on
individual investors from a unique setting provided by a recent law: the
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 ("JOBS Act"). The JOBS
Act allows certain firms conducting an initial public offering ("IPO") to
provide fewer disclosures to investors. 8 This setting allows us to provide
unique insights into the relationship between mandatory disclosure rules
and individual investor participation for two reasons. First, most firms that
conduct an IPO after the passage of the JOBS Act are allowed to provide
reduced disclosure in one or more different areas in which disclosure is
typically mandated; 9 this provides variation that allows us to study how
individual investors respond to varying levels of disclosure. Second,
because investors generally have limited information about firms before an
IPO, disclosure is especially relevant to investors at the IPO stage.10 Thus,
our setting provides a unique opportunity to test the importance of
mandatory securities disclosures to individual investors at a time when
securities law is an important source of information-indeed, sometimes
the only source of information-for those investors.
Our evidence shows that reducing the information that firms are
required to disclose before an IPO leads to a statistically and economically
significant decrease in individual investor participation in the IPO.
Importantly, however, this effect is substantially reduced during the week
of trading following the IPO-and disappears completely after two weeks.
Our findings are consistent with theory predicting that individual investors
who are at an informational disadvantage to other investors will be less
likely to participate in securities markets. But our evidence also shows

Required by Regulation S-K, Exchange Act Release No. 33-10064 (Apr. 13, 2016), available at
https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2016/33-10064.pdf.
6. For rare exceptions, see generally, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 5; Miller, supra note 5.
7. Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
8. Id. § 102.

9. See, e.g., id. § 102(b)(1)(A) (permitting an "emerging growth company" to present only two,
rather than three, years of audited financial statements in its IPO registration statement).
10. Individual investors are thought to be at an especially significant information disadvantage
prior to the IPO because, among other reasons, Regulation Fair Disclosure ("Regulation FD") does not
apply to firms that are not yet public. See infra Part I.B. Regulation FD is an SEC rule designed to
prevent selective disclosure-that is, to prevent firms from providing information to a select group of
favored investors instead of making the information available to the public at large. Under Regulation
FD, when a company discloses material nonpublic information to certain individuals or entities, like
stock analysts, the company must make the information publicly available to all potential investors.
See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2015).
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that, while this disadvantage can be addressed by mandating disclosure,
such mandates are not the only mechanism available to address these
information asymmetries.
Our findings have important implications for the regulators now
considering the costs and benefits of proposed changes to the disclosures
currently mandated by federal securities law. 12 In particular, the evidence
indicates that policymakers concerned about the effects of such changes on
individual investors might turn their focus to firms that are already
public-rather than firms at the IPO stage, where the effects of reduced
disclosures are likely to be largest for individual investors. Our findings
also suggest that lawmakers should emphasize experimental approaches to
modifying the law in this area-as the SEC has done in the past-so that
regulators and researchers can better understand the effects of these
changes on investors of all kinds.
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides
theoretical background on the relationship between mandatory disclosure
rules and individual investors' participation in stock markets. Part II
provides empirical evidence that individual investors participate less in the
IPOs of firms that disclose less under the JOBS Act-but that this effect
disappears during the two weeks of trading that follow the offering. Part
III describes the implications of our findings for lawmakers and
commentators. Part IV concludes.
I. MANDATORY DISCLOSURE AND INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS

Ever since the passage of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, commentators have offered myriad justifications
for the federal lawsS that13require public corporations to disclose certain
information to investors. In this Article, we study one frequently cited

11. See Longstreth, supra note 4, at 7.
12. See Higgins, supra note 5 (discussing the SEC's current efforts to revise the current
disclosure requirements in order to make securities filings more effective); see also Concept Release
on Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, supra note 5, at 6 (noting that the
Commission is currently "assess[ing] whether [its disclosure rules] continue to provide the information
that investors need to make informed investment and voting decisions and whether any of [the SEC's]
rules have become outdated or unnecessary").
13. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 2 (arguing that mandatory disclosure is necessary for capital
markets to function efficiently, since the benefits of disclosure are diffuse, but the costs are borne by
the firm, so that firms will not provide the efficient level of disclosure without regulation); see also
Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1047,
1051 (1995) (arguing that mandatory disclosure rules reduce agency costs by giving investors the
information they need to "police" firm management).
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justification for mandatory disclosure laws: that mandatory disclosure is
beneficial because it entices individual investors to participate in securities
markets.
This claim has been hotly debated for decades, with commentators
emphasizing two objections. First, observers dispute whether individual
investors should be encouraged to participate in equities markets at all. As
we explain in Part L.A below, some have argued forcefully that social
welfare might be enhanced by excluding-or at least discouragingindividual investors from participating in stock markets. Despite these
arguments, however, securities regulators today emphasize invididual
investor
participation as an important policy objective of modern securities
4
law.

1

Because regulators continue to pursue mechanisms for encouraging
individual investors to participate in stock markets, in Part I.B we consider
whether, in fact, providing individuals with more information about public
companies encourages them to invest. Significant recent work has
questioned that notion, arguing that, because individuals are unable to
process the overwhelming quantum of information provided in modern
securities disclosures, mandatory disclosure rules likely have little effect
on individual investor participation in markets. As we explain below,
although some previous work has attempted to examine that claim
empirically, in this Article we use a rare setting to evaluate the relationship
between mandatory disclosure and individual investor participation in
modern stock markets.
A. The OptimalRole of Individual Investors in Modem Stock Markets

Virtually since the conception of the modern federal securities
regulation apparatus, policymakers have argued that the protection of
individual investors should be among its principal goals. 15 The legislative
history of both the 1933 and 1934 Acts themselves suggest that Congress

14. See, e.g., Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Protecting the Retail Investor
(Mar. 24, 2014), available at https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370541226174 ("The
retail investor must be a constant focus of the SEC-if we fail to serve and safeguard the retail
investor, we have not fulfilled our mission.").
15. For a discussion of this issue in two of the Nation's leading securities casebooks, see
STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION 12 (2d ed. 2008) ("At various points
[throughout securities law], we... see regulatory schemes intended to protect ordinary small investors
from the big players."); JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION 2 (12th

ed. 2012) ("Historically, the securities markets have long been thought to be affected with a special
public interest.").
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intended both statutes to serve that objective. 16 Nor is the notion
antiquated. Current SEC Chair Mary Jo White has frequently worried that
today's securities regulation regime may not give individual investors
sufficient protection. 1

Recent scholarship, however, has argued forcefully that individual
investor protection should not be the central goal of securities regulation.
For example, Zohar Goshen and Gideon Parchomovsky have persuasively
argued that the objective of securities law should be to maximize social
welfare, and that to do so, lawmakers should design securities regulation
for sophisticated institutional investors rather than individuals. 18 More
recently, finance scholar Luigi Zingales has suggested that regulators
should discourage individual investors from participating in securities
markets because protecting this relatively small group of unsophisticated
investors causes a significant 19increase in regulatory costs-without
offsetting social-welfare benefits.
By contrast, some commentators have urged that individual investor
participation produces significant efficiency benefits. For example, a
group of economists recently argued that individual traders enhance
market efficiency by providing an important source of liquidity. Indeed,
there is significant empirical evidence that individual investors are
contrarian-that is, that they tend to invest against the tide of general

16. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 73-85 (1933) (surveying the decade of securities activity that
followed World War I and concluding that the stock market volatility that occurred during that decade
"spelle[d] tragedy in the lives of thousands of individuals who invested their life savings, accumulated
after years of effort, in... worthless securities").
17. See, e.g., Interview by Steven Bochner, Chair, Sec. Regulation Inst., with Mary Jo White,
Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Jan. 26, 2016), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
securities-regulation-institute-keynote-white.html (noting that invididual investors, when it comes to
IPOs, "may get very excited from an article or a blog and invest their money, and so you wony about
them not getting sufficient or accurate information").
18. See, e.g., Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities
Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711 (2006) (arguing, based on a theoretical market model, that securities
laws would be most efficient if they were designed for sophisticated institutional investors); see also
HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 14
(1979) ("[T]he SEC overestimates the average investor's ability to master the complexities of the
financial picture of the typical issuer ... and therefore has failed ... to understand that its disclosure
documents can be used effectively only by professionals.").
19. See Luigi Zingales, The Future of Securities Regulation, 47 J. ACCT. RES. 391, 417 (2009)
(suggesting that individual investors should be nudged out of equities markets so that securities laws
can be designed for efficiency rather than investor protection).
20. See, e.g., Ron Kaniel et al., Individual Investor Trading and Stock Returns, 63 J. FIN. 273,
274 (2008) ("[T]he contrarian tendency of individuals leads them to act as liquidity providers to
institutions that require immediacy."); Qin Wang & Jun Zhang, Individual Investor Trading and Stock
Liquidity, 45 REv. QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 485, 486 (2015) ("We find striking evidence that
individual investor trading has a significantly positive effect on stock liquidity.").
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market movements. These contrarian tendiences, some have argued, play
an important role in market dynamics: because individual investors often
take the other
side of large institutions' trades, they significantly improve
21
liquidity.
Despite the decades-long academic debate over whether securities law
should seek to encourage individual investors to participate in securities
markets, policymakers today consistently contend that doing so is among
their principal regulatory objectives.22 Thus, in the next Part, we turn to a
second question: how the law can best encourage individuals to invest in
securities markets. In particular, we examine current debates over whether
mandatory disclosure rules do, in fact, encourage individual investors to
participate in today's stock markets.
B. Individual Investors and MandatoryDisclosure

The claim that mandatory disclosure rules encourage individuals to
invest in securities markets rests on the premise that such rules "level the
playing field" between individuals and more sophisticated retail investors.
Individual investors, the theory goes, benefit more from mandatory
disclosure than institutional players because, while more sophisticated
investors might have other sources of information about a firm, individual
investors must rely upon securities filings for details about the firms that
they own. More recent work, however, has argued that modern securities
filings include such an overwhelming amount of information that
mandating more disclosure is unlikely to encourage individuals to invest.
Instead, under this competing view, individual investors are likely to be
overwhelmed by the volume of information in modern securities
disclosures and, thus, will not use that information in making their
investment decisions.
1. Disclosureand "Leveling the PlayingField"

For decades, the SEC has argued that extensive mandatory disclosure
rules are necessary to entice individual investors to participate in securities
markets. In 1983, for example, one Commissioner famously remarked that
"[m]andatory disclosure fosters investor confidence by ensuring all

21. See, e.g., John M. Griffin et. al., The Dynamics of Institutional and Individual Trading, 58 J.
FIN. 2285 (2003); Mark Grinblatt & Matti Keloharju, The Investment Behavior and Performance of
Various Investor Types: A Study of Finland's Unique Data Set, 55 J. FIN. ECON. 43 (2000); Mark
Grinblatt & Matti Keloharju, What Makes Investors Trade?, 56 J. FIN. 589 (2001).

22. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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investors of equal access to corporate information," noting that "[i]nvestor
confidence comes from the knowledge
that the information is equally
23
available to all-large and small."
The intuition for why mandatory disclosure spurs participation by
individual investors is twofold. First, because investors are more likely to
participate when they know more about a company, securities disclosures
are a way to ensure that individuals receive information about public
firms. Although institutional investors have access to the disclosures as
well, the information may provide a particular benefit to individuals,
because large institutions generally have access to other sources of
information.
Second, even if individuals do not learn more about public companies
from mandatory disclosures than they otherwise might, previous work has
shown that individual investors are more likely to participate in markets
when they are assured that they have equal access to information. The
reason is intuitive: if a more informed investor is willing to buy (or sell) a
security at a given price, a relatively uninformed investor taking the other
side of that trade can rationally conclude that the price she is paying to sell
(or buy) the security may be a losing proposition.2 4
Longstanding empirical work provides significant support for the idea
that more disclosure encourages individuals to participate in securities
markets. For example, one study found that the companies that hold "open
conference calls"-meaning that all investors, as opposed to only a subset
of investors or only financial analysts, are allowed to participate in the
conference call-have greater levels of individual investors.
Notably,
substantial evidence also indicates that equal access to information, rather
than merely more information, drives participation. For example,
individual participation increased after Regulation FD-the SEC
regulation intended to reduce information asymmetry among different
types of investors-went into effect. 26 Importantly, the increase in

23. See Longstreth, supra note 4, at 7.
24. See id.
25. Bushee et al., supra note 4, at 177-78.
26. See Chiraphol N. Chiyachantana et al., The Impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure on
Information Asymmetry and Trading: An Intraday Analysis, 39 FIN. REV. 549 (2004); see also
Christian Leuz & Peter Wysocki, The Economics of Disclosure and Financial Reporting Regulation:
Evidence and Suggestions for Future Research 24-25 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper
No. 306/2016, 2015), available at http://research.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/7628D551E7424DC085
24879103870C12.pdf (describing empirical evidence demonstrating that increased corporate
disclosure can mitigate information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors by
reducing the opportunities for investors to become privately informed). For a discussion of Regulation
FD, see supra note 10.
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individual participation was attributable to the fact that information was
now available to all investors equally, not to an increase in the total
amount of information available. 2
We note that the risk that individual investors will be less informed
than large institutions is particularly pronounced at the IPO stage-the
setting we study here. The reason is that Regulation FD does not apply
prior to the IPO, thus allowing management to disclose information to
institutional investors that is not publicly available. 28 The risk that
individual investors face in this context was powerfully demonstrated in
the aftermath of Facebook's recent IPO. Following disappointing returns
on the first few days of trading, it was revealed that Facebook's
management informed financial analysts prior to the IPO that future
earnings were expected to be less robust than originally predicted.
However, only select clients such as financial analysts-and not the
general public-were informed of the update. 29 While Regulation FD
would have prohibited such selective disclosure if it had applied,
Facebook disclosed the information prior to the IPO, and its disclosures
thus fell outside the scope of Regulation FD.
2. Disclosureand "Information Overload"

Notwithstanding substantial evidence that increasing the level of
disclosure will enhance individual investor participation in stock markets,
other work has argued that more disclosure will discourage individuals
from investing. The reason is that today's securities disclosures arguably
provide too much detail on public companies, making it impossible for
individual investors, with limited analytical resources, to make meaningful
use of the disclosed information.
Significant psychology research has shown that when individuals are
presented with extensive information about a particular decision, they
become more likely to rely on heuristics than systematic evaluation,
30
decreasing the quality of information processing-and decisions.

27. See Chiyachantana et al., supra note 26, at 560.
28. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,725 (Aug. 24, 2000)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249) ("[W]ith limited exceptions, Regulation FD as adopted does
not apply to disclosures made in connection with a securities offering registered under the Securities
Act.").
29. See Shayndi Raice et al., Inside Fumbled Facebook Offering, WALL ST.J. (May 23, 2012,
11:00 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 10001424052702304019404577420660698374718.
30. See generally JOHN W. PAYNE ET AL., THE ADAPTIVE DECISION MAKER (1993); John W.
Payne, Contingent Decision Behavior, 92 PSYCHOL. BULL. 382 (1982); John W. Payne et al., Adaptive
Strategy Selection in Decision Making, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 534 (1988). For important
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Consistent with that notion, studies on individual investors and financial
disclosures have suggested that individuals may be unable to effectively
process the information public companies provide under today's securities
laws; for example, empirical work has suggested that individuals
are less
31
likely to invest in firms with greater financial complexity.
Indeed, some recent work goes even further, arguing that more
extensive mandatory disclosure rules disadvantage individual investors
because of the greater information-processing capabilities of institutional
shareholders. 32 Empirical work has shown that institutional investors are
33
better able to process financial disclosures than individual shareholders,
raising the possibility that mandatory disclosure rules provide a
disproportionate benefit to certain sophisticated investors. Because these
sophisticated investors are better able to interpret the information provided
under mandatory disclosure rules, the argument goes, these rules have the
unintended consequence of increasing information asymmetry between
institutional investors and individual shareholders.34
These concerns have led commentators and lawmakers alike to wonder
whether existing disclosure rules disadvantage individual investors by
requiring firms to provide an overwhelming amount of information in
securities filings. For example, former SEC Commissioner Troy Paredes
has argued in these pages that today's mandatory disclosure rules may be
counterproductive, leading investors who are overwhelmed with
information to make worse investment decisions than they otherwise
35
might. And the SEC's own recent study of its mandatory disclosure rules
repeatedly suggested that some disclosure requirements have produced

recent work describing the implications of these insights for disclosures mandated throughout the law,
see OMRi BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE
OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014); Ryan Bubb, TMI? Why the Optimal Architecture of Disclosure
Remains TBD, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1021 (2015).
31. See Miller, supra note 5, at 2107.
32. See, e.g., Charles M. C. Lee et al., Spreads, Depths, and the Impact of Earnings Information:
An Intraday Analysis, 6 REv. FIN. STUD. 345 (1993). Additional information can also exacerbate
information asymmetry if the additional information complements the information set held by somebut not all-investors.
33. See, e.g., Alan Guoming Huang et al., Institutional Trading Around Corporate News:
Evidence from Textual Analysis (May 30, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2336069.
34. See Robert E. Verrecchia, Essays on Disclosure, 32 J. ACCT. & ECON. 97, 172 (2001)

(describing instances in which greater disclosure may exacerbate information asymmetry among
investors).
35. See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for
Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417,419 (2003).
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"lengthy, technical disclosure[s]" that are not useful to individual
36
investors.
The more general debate over whether the law should encourage
individual investor participation in markets is unlikely to be amenable to
systematic empirical analysis.3 However, the competing hypotheses
described above about how mandatory disclosure rules affect individual
investor behavior are empirically testable. On the one hand, if these rules
benefit individual investors, we would predict that a decrease in the
quantum of disclosure required by the law would lead to less individual
investor participation in markets. On the other, if individuals do indeed
suffer from "disclosure overload," we would expect that a decrease in the
information required to be disclosed under securities law would have no
effect-or might even increase-individuals' willingness to invest. In the
next Part, we provide the first empirical evidence testing these competing
theoretical predictions.
II.

DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS

As explained in Part I, lawmakers are now debating how the law can
best facilitate individual investor participation in modern markets-and, in
particular, mandatory disclosure rules as a policy mechanism for doing so.
Would increasing the required disclosures under federal securities law
overwhelm individual investors, leading them to exit stock markets? Or
would requiring more information in securities filings assure individuals
that they are on a level playing field with more savvy institutional players,
enhancing individual investor participation? In this Article, we use
evidence from the recent passage of the JOBS Act to provide the first-ever
empirical study of these questions.
The evidence shows that the reduction in mandatory disclosure that
occurred under the JOBS Act led to a reduction in trading by individual
investors, suggesting that individuals prefer to receive more information
under these disclosures rather than less.38 Importantly, however, the data

36. See SEC REPORT, supra note 5, at 101. In fact, the Director of the SEC's Division of

Corporation Finance-which oversees, among other things, many of the SEC's disclosure mandatesrecently stated that the division is reconsidering those rules in light of the "growing concern about

disclosure overload" that may lead "an individual investor [to] feel overloaded-and a bit
overwhelmed-with information." Higgins, supra note 5.
37. See, e.g., Zingales, supra note 19 (noting that preventing individual investor participation in
securities markets would have the distinct disadvantage of making measuring the social-welfare effects
of such participation methodologically infeasible).
38. See infra Part II.E.

2015]

MANDATORY DISCLOSURE AND INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS

also indicate that these differences in individual investor trading disappear
relatively quickly after the company's IPO within two weeks.3 9 Thus,
our findings suggest that, while a decrease in mandatory disclosure might
initially reduce individual investor participation-particularly at the IPO
stage-other information-generating activities, such as active trading of
the company's stock, might entice individuals to continue to invest in
public companies.
A. The JOBS Act
The JOBS Act was signed into law on April 5, 2012, with the stated
purpose of increasing "American job creation and economic growth by
improving access to the public capital markets for emerging growth
companies. ' 4° Specifically, Congress intended to provide smaller, growing
companies with cheaper access to capital. 4 1 To reduce the costs associated
with IPOs, the Act created a new class of companies, Emerging Growth
Companies ("EGCs"), which may provide reduced disclosures in their
securities filings in connection with their IPOs. 42 The primary requirement
for qualifying as an EGC is that the company must have less than $1
billion in total revenue in its most recently completed fiscal year.43
1. Reductions in DisclosureAvailable to EGCs
Provided that they do not lose their EGC status, EGCs may provide
reduced disclosure for the first five years following their IPO. 44 These
reduced disclosures typically relate to one of four areas of the firm's
finances and governance.4 5 First, EGCs may choose to provide two (rather
than three) years of historical audited financial data.4 6 Second, EGCs are
not required to produce the internal controls report required by Section

39. Id.
40. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, pmbl., 126 Stat. 306, 306 (2012).
41. Indeed, Congress's intent is demonstrated by the name of Title II of the JOBS Act: "Access
to Capital for Job Creators." Id. § 201.
42. See id. § 102.
43. See id. § 101(a).
44. See id.
45. For a discussion of all reduced disclosures available to EGCs, see id. § 102. For more detail,
see U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, JUMPSTART OUR BUSINESS STARTUPS ACT: FREQUENTLY ASKED

QUESTIONS, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/Corpfin/guidance/cfjobsactfaq-title-i-general.htm (last modified
Dec. 21, 2015) [hereinafter FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS].
46. JOBS Act § 102(b)(1)(A); see also FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 45.

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 93:293

404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 4 Section 404 requires that
management and an outside auditor provide an assessment of the firm's
internal controls in a special report. 4 8 Third, EGCs can elect to provide
less disclosure regarding their executives' pay; specifically, they can
disclose historical compensation data for three (rather than five)
49
executives for the previous two (rather than three) years.
Finally, EGCs can choose to pursue a "confidential" IPO process, in
which the company privately submits its registration statement to the SEC
instead of filing it publicly. 50 In a non-confidential filing, potential
investors can view the registration statement as soon as the company has
filed it, and can view the back-and-forth process between
S 51 the SEC and the
company, which can reveal important information. In a confidential
filing, the draft registration statements are instead released as exhibits to
the final registration statement when it is made publicly available.52 From
the company's perspective, a confidential filing is beneficial because it
allows the company to have more control over the timing of its IPO
announcement-a crucial component of IPO success.
2. Previous Work on the JOBS Act
Prior literature on the JOBS Act has largely focused on whether the Act
has, in fact, reduced the costs of going public for the EGCs that took

47. JOBS Act § 103.
48. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). The implementation of Section 404 is associated with
increased reliability of reported financials and fewer intentional misstatements. See Ziv Singer &
Haifeng You, The Effect of Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Earnings Quality, 26 J. AcCT.,
AUDITING & FIN. 556 (2011). However, it has also increased audit fees significantly, particularly for
smaller firms. See Peter liev, The Effect of SOX Section 404: Costs, Earnings Quality, and Stock
Prices, 65 J. FIN. 1163, 1166 (2010).
49. JOBS Act § 102(a). These disclosures are required by 17 C.F.R. § 229.402.
50. JOBS Act § 106. All securities filings made in connection with the company's registration
statement must be made public no later than twenty-one days prior to the company's "road show." A
"road show" is when the company's managers and financial advisors present the company to potential
buyers in order to generate interest in the company's securities. See Conditions to Permissible PostFiling Free Writing Prospectuses, 17 C.F.R. § 230.433(h)(4) (2016).
51. For example, the SEC forced Groupon to revise its initial registration statement because it
used non-standard accounting principles. Upon completion of all revisions, total revenues in the first
half of 2011 decreased from roughly $1.5 billion to $688 million. See Alexia Tsotsis, Groupon IPO
Shares Pop 40% on First Trade, Debuts at $28 with a $17.8B Market Cap, TEC-CRUNCH (Nov. 4,
2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/11/04/groupon-ipo-shares-pop-40-on-first-trade-debuts-at- 17-8bmarket-cap/.
52. JOBS Act § 106(a); see also infra note 63 (describing how these filings can be obtained).
53. See Tim Loughran & Jay R. Ritter, Why Don't Issuers Get Upset About Leaving Money on

the Table in IPOs?, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 413,433-37 (2002).
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advantage of the reduced disclosures allowed under the Act. While several
studies have so far found that the Act had no effect on the direct
54 costs of
going public-like underwriter, legal, and accounting fees _several
studies have found that the JOBS Act has increased the indirect costs of
going public. For example, recent work shows that, relative to comparable
non-EGC firms, EGCs suffer greater IPO underpricing5 and stock-price
volatility in the period following the IPO. 5 6 These findings suggest that the
Act may have had the
unintended consequence of raising the cost of
57
firms.
EGC
capital for
As to whether the Act achieved its goal of facilitating small firms'
ability to raise capital, the early literature is mixed. One study found that
the Act led to an increase in US IPO volume, with the bulk of that growth
driven by firms with high disclosure costs-suggesting that the JOBS Act
achieved its goal of encouraging such firms to go public. 58 Another study,
however, suggested that there has 59not been a general increase in IPO
growth since the passage of the Act.
To our knowledge, no previous work has attempted to use the JOBS
Act to evaluate the relationship between mandatory disclosure and
individual investor participation. Rather than focusing on the effect of the
Act on the companies themselves, we focus on the effect of the law on the
companies' investor bases. Because the Act reduces the amount of
information required to be disclosed by federal law at a moment when
individual investors might most fear that they are at an information deficit
relative to institutional shareholders-at the IPO stage, when Regulation
FD does not apply-it offers a unique setting in which to test the effects of
securities law on different types of investors. In particular, in the Parts that
follow, we use the Act to study the relationship between mandatory
disclosure rules and individual investor participation.

54. See Susan Chaplinsky et al., The JOBS Act and the Costs of Going Public (Oct. 4, 2015)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract id=2492241.
55. See id.; see also Mary E. Barth et al., The JOBS Act and Information Uncertainty in IPO

Firms 4 (Stanford Univ. Graduate Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. 14-26, 2014), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract id=2465927; Sudip Gupta & Ryan D. Israelsen, Hard
and Soft Information: Firm Disclosure, SEC Letters, and the JOBS Act (Kelley Sch. of Bus., Research

Paper No. 2014-34, 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract id=2473509.
56. See Barth et al., supra note 55, at 18-20.
57. See Chaplinsky et al., supra note 54, at 12-19 (finding that potential IPO growth was limited
to two industries, biotech and pharmaceuticals, that have limited immediate growth prospects).
58. See Michael Dambra et al., The JOBS Act and IPO Volume: Evidence That Disclosure Costs

Affect the IPO Decision, 116 J. FIN. ECON. 121 (2015) (measuring disclosure costs by research
intensity and industry concentration).
59. See Chaplinsky et al., supra note 54, at 6.
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B. Descriptive Statistics
We began by examining each of the registration statements for all firms
that held their IPO after the JOBS Act went into effect. There were fiftyfour firms that conducted IPOs from December 8, 2011, through April 5,
2012 (the period during which the JOBS Act was applied retroactively),
and 345 firms that conducted an IPO from April 5, 2012 (the day the
JOBS Act was passed), through April 16, 2014. 6 1 We pulled the
registration statements 62 from the SEC's EDGAR database for each of
these filings and hand-collected data from each firm's registration
statement to determine whether
the firm utilized any of the modifications
63
available under the JOBS Act.
The descriptive statistics for these companies are provided in Tables I
and II. Table I indicates that the vast majority of firms that held an IPO
during the period we study are EGC-eligible-that is, they are permitted
under the Act to provide less information to investors in advance of their
IPO than firms that are not EGCs. The table shows the number of firms
that would have been eligible for EGC status-the firms with less than $1
billion in revenue in the fiscal year immediately prior to their IPOrelative to the number of IPOs for each year from January 1, 2007, through
April 16, 2014. Out of the 941 total IPOs, 829 had less than $1 billion in
revenue. This indicates that the JOBS Act altered the disclosure rules
applicable at the IPO stage for the vast majority of firms that go public.

60. We specifically examined all firms that conducted an IPO from December 8, 2011, through
April 16, 2014. To create this list, we used Thomson Reuters's SDC database. To obtain accounting
information, such as the value of each company's total assets, we merged the data from the Thomas
Reuters SDC database with the Compustat database. Compustat, which contains financial data for all
companies listed on US stock exchanges from 1926 through the present, is available through Wharton
Research Data Services. See WRDS, http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds.
61. These data are available from the authors upon request.
62. The registration statement is Form S-1 for US firms and Form F-1 for foreign firms. If the
registration statement was unavailable, we dropped the observation. We also removed all real estate
investment trusts.
63. To determine whether the firm opted out of Section 404, provided fewer years of financial
data, or provided fewer years of compensation history, we examined each company's registration
statement. We began with the original filing, but also reviewed all amendments prior to the IPO date to
update the original coding as necessary. To identify confidential filers, we searched for the three ways
a firm can file a confidential registration statement with the SEC. These three options are as follows.
First, the firm can file a Draft Registration Statement ("DRS") in EDGAR. Second, companies can
request confidential treatment by sending an email to the SEC. Third, companies can request
confidential treatment by sending a request through the mail.
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TABLE I: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Number
of
IPOs

Num. IPOs < SIB
in Revenue in

Percentage
EGC

Prior FY

Eligible

Jan. 1, 2007-Dec. 31, 2007

224

202

90%

Jan. 1, 2008-Dec. 31, 2008

55

48

87%

Jan. 1, 2009-Dec. 31, 2009

51

43

84%

Jan. 1, 2010-Dec. 31, 2010

108

97

90%

Jan. 1, 2011 -Dec. 8, 2011

101

94

93%

Retroactive

Dec. 9, 2011 -Apr. 5, 2012

57

51

89%

JOBS Act in

Apr. 6, 2012-Dec. 31, 2012

83

70

84%

Effect

Jan. 1, 2013-Dec. 31, 2013

200

167

84%

Jan. 1, 2014-Apr. 16, 2014

62

57

92%

941

829

88%

Pre-JOBS
Act

JOBS Act

Total:

Table II shows that most EGCs took a piecemeal approach in which
they utilized some, but not all, of the modifications to the IPO process
available to them. Of the EGCs in our sample, the most popular JOBS Act
modification-selected by over 95% of our EGC-eligible firms-was the
option to omit the internal controls report required by Section 404 of
Sarbanes-Oxley. However, many of the other modified disclosures were
also popular-over 70% of EGCs chose to file their registration statements
confidentially, and over 40% of firms provided only two years of audited
financial history. Additionally, roughly 65% provided reduced
compensation disclosures.
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TABLE II: DISCLOSURE REDUCTIONS AMONG EGC-ELIGIBLE FIRMS

Total

Number of
EGCs Electing Each Modification
_____

EGC-

Opt Eligibe
Out of

Confidential

Eligible
1POs

sox
Section 404

Filing

Less
Years of
Fewer
SOXComp.
Financial History Disclosure
Dslsr

Apr. 6, 2012 - Dec. 31, 2012

70

65

16

20

36

Jan. 1,2013 - Dec. 31, 2013

167

165

139

45

109

Jan. 1, 2014 -Apr. 16, 2014

57

55

55

30

45

Total:

294

285

126

95

190

To determine whether the percentage of firms opting for each
modification varied over time, Figure I charts the percentage of firms
selecting each option relative to the number of EGC-eligible IPOs per
month. Panel A shows the total number of IPOs and the number of EGCeligible IPOs by month, and Panels B through E show the total number of
EGC-eligible firms that provided reduced disclosure in each of the four
areas.
Although we did not see a time trend in the number of firms that opted
out of Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley or provided fewer years of
compensation or financial data, the percentage of eligible firms electing to
file confidentially increased steadily over our sample period. The average
percentage of confidential filers was roughly 23% from April through
December of 2012, and did not exceed 50% in any month during this
period, but increased to an average of 87% thereafter. This is not
surprising, however, because many of the firms that held their IPOs in
2012 had initiated the registration process prior to the passage of the JOBS
Act, meaning that these firms were required to file a non-confidential
registration statement. Thus, the firms that held their IPO in 2013 or later
had greater opportunity to make use of this modification.
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FIGURE I, PANEL A: IPOS AND EGC-ELIGIBLE FIRMS BY MONTH
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FIGURE I, PANEL B: EGC-ELIGIBLE FIRMS FILING CONFIDENTIALLY
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FIGURE I, PANEL C: EGC-ELIGIBLE FIRMS THAT REDUCE COMPENSATION
DISCLOSURE
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FIGURE I, PANEL D: EGC-ELIGIBLE FIRMS THAT PROVIDE FEWER YEARS OF
FINANCIAL DATA
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FIGURE I, PANEL E: EGC-ELIGIBLE FIRMS THAT OPT OUT OF SOX SECTION 404
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C. Key Variables of Interest
1. DisclosureIndex
The descriptive statistics indicate that most firms selected a piecemeal
approach in which they opted for some, but not all, of the reduced
disclosures available to them under the JOBS Act. This allows us to study
whether the number of reduced disclosures varies cross-sectionally with
individual trading. If each of the disclosures mandated for non-EGCs
provides valuable information to individual investors, we would expect
that individual trading of a particular company would correspondingly
decrease as the company provides fewer disclosures. To test this
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possibility, we constructed a firm-level index (the Disclosure Index, or
"DI") consisting of the elements below.64
1. Did the firm provide fewer than three years of audited financial
statements? EGCs are eligible to provide two (rather than three)
years of prior audited financial data.
2. Did the firm opt out of the internal controls report required by
Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley? We consider this provision to be
disclosure related because the report provides individual investors
with further detail on the reliability of the audited financials.
3. Did the firm provide reduced compensation disclosures? EGCs
may disclose compensation for three (rather than five) executive
officers, and may elect to report compensation for the last two
(rather than three) years. We code the firm as providing less
disclosure if the firm provides either fewer years of data or data for
fewer executives.
4. Did the firm file its registration statement confidentially?
Although confidential filers eventually disclose the same amount of
information, we consider this provision to be disclosure related
because it may severely limit the amount of time investors have to
process the filings in question-a fact that has caused some to argue
that the modification unfairly discriminates against individual
65
investors.
We sum the reduced number of disclosures taken by each firm to create an
index ranging from 0 to 4. Firms that provide reduced disclosure in all

64. We note that the elements included in the DI do not reflect the entire set of IPO modifications
allowed under the JOBS Act. See supra notes 43-49. For the DI, we only included the modifications
that are most relevant for our purposes-that is, those that most directly reduced information
communicated to investors.
65. Confidential filers must wait a minimum of twenty-one days after their first public filing to
officially begin their road shows, but critics argue that this is not enough time for individual investors,
who presumably have other employment, to fully review the final registration statement and the
attached exhibits. According to one prominent investor, Rett Wallace of Triton Research LLC, "Even
for professionals, unless you're narrowly focused, three weeks is not a lot of time. If you're a retail
investor and you have a day job, God help you." Telis Demos, Companies Find a Faster IPO
Turnaround Doesn't Hurt, WALL. ST. J. (Sept. 29, 2013, 10:00 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB 10001424052702304795804579101731755248194 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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areas are coded as having a DI of 4, whereas firms that do not take any
reductions are coded as having a DI of 0.66
2. Measure of Individual Participation

Empirical study on trading by individual investors has been hampered
by the lack of available trading data. Because there is no way to determine

whether every trade placed on every exchange comes from an individual
or an institution, prior literature has used a number of proxies for trading
by individual investors. Most studies have used small trade sizes to proxy
for trades by individuals. 67 However, while this approach may have been
accurate historically, it is no longer a valid proxy because institutions now
use computer algorithms to disguise their trades by breaking them into
smaller components. 68 In light of concerns that trade size may not be an
accurate proxy, some researchers have used individual investor trading
from brokerage firms. 69 Although this approach has the advantage of using
actual trading data rather than a proxy for trading, the disadvantage is that
the study will usually be limited to evidence from one brokerage firm.
We instead use actual trading data from the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE") to estimate individual investment. 70 The primary advantage of
this database is that it contains actual trading data for all investors who
trade on the NYSE, thus negating the use of proxies and allowing for the

66. Many of these firms took advantage of additional modifications that are available to EGC
firms but are not disclosure related. We address the concern that our results may be driven by
modifications to the IPO process rather than the reduced level of disclosure in our Appendix.
67. See, e.g., Bushee et al., supra note 4; Miller, supra note 5; see also Nilabhra Bhattacharya,
Investors' Trade Size and Trading Responses Around Earnings Announcements: An Empirical
Investigation, 76 ACCT. REV. 221 (2001); Nilabhra Bhattacharya et al., Who Trades on Pro Forma
Earnings Information?, 82 AcCT.REV. 581 (2007); Gus De Franco et al., Wealth Transfer Effects of
Analysts' Misleading Behavior, 45 J. ACCT. REs. 71 (2007); Charles M.C. Lee, Earnings News and
Small Traders: An Intraday Analysis, 15 J. ACCT.& ECON. 265 (1992).
68. See, e.g., John Y. Campbell et al., Caught on Tape: Institutional Trading, Stock Returns, and
Earnings Announcements, 92 J. FIN. EcON. 66 (2009) (developing a method for backing out
algorithmic trades and showing key characteristics of institutional trading behavior).
69. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 5.
70. Specifically, we use the NYSE ReTrac database. The database is constructed using the NYSE
Equity Consolidated Audit Trade File, which provides a chronological reconstruction of all stock
trades that are executed on the NYSE. One of the fields included in the audit trade files, Account Type,
indicates whether the trade originated from an individual or institution. This field has been included
since October 1988, when it was included to ensure that trades by individuals received fair treatment
relative to trades by institutions. It is a mandatory field, and brokers submitting an order on behalf of
an individual are instructed to note that the order originated from an individual. For other studies using
these data, see, for example, Ron Kaniel et al., Individual Investor Trading and Return Patterns
Around Earnings Announcements, 67 J. FIN. 639 (2012); Kaniel et al., supra note 20; Wang & Zhang,
supra note 20.
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results to be generalized beyond one brokerage house. 7 1 The primary
disadvantage is that these data only include NYSE firms that held IPOs
through July 2013, which limits our analyses to these observations. To
measure individual participation, we calculate the percentage of daily
trading by
individuals in each security relative to total trading in that
72
security.
D. Research Design
To test whether there has been a change in the level of individual
participation, we needed to compare the firms that provided reduced
disclosure (the "treatment firms") with a set of firms that did not modify
their disclosures (the "control firms"). Following other recent empirical
studies on the JOBS Act, our control group consisted of firms that held
IPOs prior to the JOBS Act and would have been eligible for EGC status if
their IPOs had been completed when the JOBS Act was in effect-that is,
firms with less than $1 billion in annual
revenue in the most recently
73
completed fiscal year prior to the IPO.
Using this control group, our primary empirical design used three
different analyses to determine whether there was a change in the level of
individual participation: (1) linear regression, (2) modified propensity
score matching, and (3) analysis over an extended period of time. The key
variables of interest were a dummy variable set to 1 if the firm had taken
advantage of any modification and set to 0 otherwise, and the DI reflecting
the total number of reduced disclosures taken. All regressions controlled
for the firm-level characteristics most likely to affect individual

71. Because many individuals trade off-exchange, we use an additional measure of individual
participation based on non-institutional holdings in the robustness section. Our findings are consistent
using this additional proxy.
72. As in prior literature, such as the IndVolume Ratio defined in Wang and Zhang, supra note
20, we calculate the absolute individual trading activity ("IT") relative to the total trading activity
("TT"). The IT measure is equal to the total number of shares that were bought and sold by individual
investors during a particular day, and the TT measure is equal to the total number of shares that were
bought and sold by all NYSE customers during the initial day of trading. The TT measure is from the
TAQ database. The TAQ database, which we access through Wharton Research Data Services,
contains trade-by-trade data for all exchange-listed stocks.
73. See Barth et al., supra note 55; Chaplinsky et al., supra note 54; Gupta & Israelsen, supra
note 55. We note that we began our control sample in 2007 because, although trading by individuals
decreased significantly at the end of 2006, it remained constant from 2007 through April 2014 (we
determined this by plotting the percentage of trading by individuals relative to total trading for each
month from January 2005 through April 2014).
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investment, 7 4 and included fixed effects for the firm's underwriter and
industry. 75 Standard errors were clustered by industry.
One significant concern with our analysis is that the firms that provided
less disclosure self-selected to do so. In an ideal experimental setting, the
treatment and control firms are randomly assigned to each group. When
firms instead self-select into the treatment group, as in our setting here,
there is a possibility that the firms have a unique characteristic that causes
both reduced individual participation and the choice to be a treatment firm.
We note that two of our analyses address this concern. First, our second
analysis uses modified propensity score matching ("PSM") to match the
treatment and control firms. PSM is a statistical technique that is
frequently used to address non-random sample selection, and allows us to
match each firm in the treatment group with the most similar firm in the
control group. Second, we examined whether the initial reduction in
individual trading disappeared over time. If the treatment firms do not
differ from the control sample, we expect that the differences in individual
trading between the two samples will disappear soon after the IPO
because, after trading begins, individual investors will have access to more
sources of information. These other sources of information, such as
trading history and financial analyst reports, provide additional sources of

74. Following Lawrence, supra note 5, we control for (1) Log(Assets), calculated as the natural
logarithm of the firm's total assets in each fiscal year; (2) Book-to-Market, calculated as the book
value of equity scaled by the market value of equity for the firm in each fiscal year, where the market
value is calculated as the share price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding; (3) Return On
Assets (ROA), calculated as the firm's net income before extraordinary items divided by the firm's
total assets in each fiscal year; (4) Log(Business Segments), the natural logarithm of 1 plus the number
of the firm's business segments in each fiscal year; (5) Log(Geographic Segments), the natural
logarithm of 1 plus the number of the firm's geographic segments in each fiscal year; and
(6) Log(Num. Missing Items), the natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of missing pieces of
financial information for the firm in each fiscal year (this is determined as the number of missing items
in the Compustat database). We also control for the natural logarithm of the firm's total revenue in the
most recently completed fiscal year, the firm's research and development expenses scaled by total
assets, the firm's age (we thank Jay R. Ritter for providing founding dates for IPO firms on his
website), whether the firm is incorporated in the United States or abroad, and whether the firm is in a
technology industry. We determine whether a firm is in a technology industry in accordance with Tim
Loughran & Jay Ritter, Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time?, 33 FIN. MGMT. 5 (2004).
Although these variables are based on Lawrence, supra note 5, we had to omit a limited number of
controls because of our data and setting. To control for outliers, all control variables were winsorized
at 1%.
75. The firm's industry is based on the fourty-eight Fama-French industry classifications. For
detail on the forty-eight industries, see Kenneth R. French, Detail for 48 Industry Portfolios, KENNETH
R. FRENCH, http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data Library/det 48 ind port.
html (last visited Nov. 29, 2015). Industries are defined as, for example, "Food," "Transportation," and
"Insurance." Id.

2015]

MANDATORY DISCLOSURE AND INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS

information that can reduce information asymmetry between different
types of investors.
Finally, we ran a number of additional robustness checks to address
other concerns with our research design. These tests addressed the
appropriateness of our control sample, the robustness of our key measure
of individual investment and trading, and the possibility that individuals
may be responding to modifications in the IPO process rather than to the
reduced level of disclosure. These analyses are presented in the Appendix.
E. EmpiricalFindings
1. LinearRegression
Our first analysis compares the treatment and control firms using
ordinary least squares regression analysis in which the dependent variable
is the percentage of total trading that is conducted by individual investors.
The key variable in column (1) is the dummy variable Modified, which is
set to 1 if the firm provided reduced disclosure in any area, and 0
otherwise. The key variable in column (2) is Disclosure Index, which is
the value of the DI for any particular firm. Throughout all tables, statistical
significance of 1, 5, and 10 percent is reflected by ***, **, and *,
respectively, and p-values are reflected in parentheses below the
regression coefficients.
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TABLE III: INDIVIDUAL TRADING IN FIRMS WITH REDUCED DISCLOSURE,
FIRST DAY

(1)
M\'odified

(2)

-O.033***
(00.0039)

LogAssts)(0.324)

(0.337)

-0.007

-0.007
(0.414)

Log(Ae)

0.003
-0.007
(0.6373)

0.003
-0.007
(0.669)

Book-to-Market

0.007
(0.69)

0.008
(0.686)

0.0378***
(0.0001)

0.035***
(0.0003)

0.0037

0.0055

(0.65)

(0.651)

loRendex(0.432)

Log(Business Segments)
Log(Geographic Segments)
Log(Num. Missing Items)

(0.671)
0.0048
0.362

0.36

0.12

0.1)

(0.127)

(0.141)

-0.0087

-0.0134

0.01
(0.221)

0.01
(0.196)

0.0115

0.0112

Yes
Yes
0.3478
218

Yes
Yes
0.3379
218

(0.922)

U.S. Incorp.
Industry Fixed Effects
Underwriter Fixed Effects
R-squared
Num. Observations

(0.517)
0.005

(0.32)

(0.881)

(0.333)

The results presented in Table III show that the average percentage of
individual trading was lower for the treatment firms than the control firms.
Column (1) shows that, as a percentage of total daily trading, individual
trading was roughly 3.3% lower for the firms that provided reduced
disclosure. Column (2) examines the cross-sectional variation in the
number of reductions in disclosure taken by each firm and shows that the
decrease in individual trading volume is additive. On average, individual
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trading relative to total trades decreases by an additional 1.1% for each
additional reduction in disclosure (that is, for each additional increase in
the firm's DI). This suggests that all the disclosures are relevant to
investors.
2. Modified Propensity Score Matching
In our next analysis, we used PSM to address the possibility that the
firms that self-selected to provide fewer disclosures differed systematically
from the control sample. PSM uses observable characteristics, such as a
firm's country of incorporation or total assets, to match each treatment
firm to the most similarly situated control firm. Although the match is
performed along observable characteristics, the firms will theoretically be
similar along unobservable characteristics as well.
To create a PSM sample, the first step is to determine the variables that
predict the treatment (i.e., to determine which variables predict that a firm
will provide reduced disclosure). In this first step, we found that very few
observable characteristics were able to predict, at standard levels of
statistical significance, whether the firm would be treated. 76 On the one
hand, the fact that few firm characteristics appeared to be related to the
decision to provide reduced disclosure suggests that there may be little
self-selection bias. On the other hand, because our statistical tests have
only limited power in predicting whether a firm will be treated, a question
remains as to whether the matched sample that is created based on these
tests addresses any unobserved differences.
Table IV compares the treatment firms with the matched sample. 77 The
table shows that, although the control variables do not differ significantly
between the treatment and control samples, individual investors are less
likely to trade in the firms that provide less disclosure.

76. There are minor differences in the modified filers and control sample. Most notably, the
modified filers appear to have fewer business and geographic segments, fewer missing pieces of
financial information in the current fiscal year, and much greater research and development expenses
relative to assets.
77. We matched the treatment and control firms based on their propensity score, provided that
both firms were in the same Fama-French industry and had the same incorporation status (foreign or
domestic).
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TABLE IV: PROPENSITY-SCORE-MATCHED CONTROL AND TREATMENT FIRMS

Log(Assets)
Log(Revenue)
Log(Age)
Book-to-Market
ROA
Log(Business
Segments)
Log(Geographic
Segments)
Log(Number
Missing Items)
R&D/Assets
Ind(ividal1 TIn

Propensity Score
Matched Sample
(N=42)
Mean
Median
5.986
5.763
5.266
4.929
1.93
2.197

Treatment
Sample
(N=42)
Mean
Median
6.018
5.806
5.349
5.477
2.217
2.197

Difference
in
Means
p-value
0.903
0.694
0.178

Difference
in
Medians
p-value
0.42
0.187
0.402

0.382
-0.019

0.325
0.014

0.478
0.019

0.256
0.012

0.481
0.774

0.297
0.236

0.814

0.693

0.771

0.693

0.618

0.251

0.859

0.693

0.819

0.896

0.793

0.491

6.406
6.397
0.069
0.000
I0.0201
0016

0.803
0.727
U0.0*

0.338
0.453
0.(HQIll

6.403
0.062
0).05)-1

6.389
0.009
0.0294

Specifically, the mean difference in individual trading for the treatment
firms is roughly 3% lower than the mean for the matched control firms.
The difference is statistically significant at 1%. Similarly, the median
difference for the treatment sample is roughly 1.5% lower than the control
sample, and the difference is statistically significant at 5%. The findings
are thus both economically and statistically significant.
3. Analysis Beyond the FirstDay of Trading
The prior analyses showed that the firms that provided less disclosure
had lower individual participation on their first day of trading.78 From a
policy perspective, however, we might wonder whether there are longterm differences. If, as theoretical literature predicts, uninformed investors
are less likely to invest when they perceive information asymmetry to be
higher, 79 the effect is likely to disappear over time. Compared with the
vast sources of information that become available after a firm is public,
such as a firm's stock price and reports from financial analysts, the
reduced disclosures allowed by the JOBS Act seem relatively minor. As
such, even if individuals feel disadvantaged on the first day of trading,
when information asymmetry is likely to be the strongest, the effect may
be short-lived.

78. See supra Part II.E.
79. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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To test whether the result persists over an extended time period, Table
V presents a series of linear regressions in which the dependent variable is
individual trading behavior on the initial day of trading as well as seven,
fourteen, twenty-one, sixty, and ninety days following the IPO. The key
variables of interest in Panels A and B are the Modified and Disclosure
Index variables, respectively.
TABLE V, PANEL A: INDIVIDUAL TRADING IN FIRMS WITH REDUCED DISCLOSURE

Modified
Control Variables
Industry &
Underwriter Fixed
Effects
R-squared
Num. Observations
TABLE V, PANEL

Control Variables
Industry &
Underwriter Fixed
Effects
R-squared
Num. Observations

1st Day

7th Day

14th
Day

21st Day

(0).0)17)

Q6
(0.()(7)

.25
(02607)

0l1
()0632

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.3787

0.5006

0.3573

0.4569

0.3938

0.4221

203

203

203

203

203

203

B: INDIVIDUAL TRADING

60th Day
00 I006
1(0.90)(4)

90th Day
.0
1(0.839)

IN FIRMS WITH REDUCED DISCLOSURE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.3677

0.4812

0.3481

0.402

0.3837

0.3562

203

203

203

203

203

203

The results show that the statistical significance associated with our

variables of interest decreased in the days following the IPO. Although all
results were statistically significant on the initial day of trading and
remained significant seven days following the IPO, statistical significance
disappeared for both the Modified and Disclosure Index variables fourteen
days after the IPO, indicating that trading by individual investors was not
statistically different than expected two weeks after the firm's IPO.
From the perspective of our research design, the finding provides us
with confidence that our results are not caused by a self-selection bias
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related to the firms that select to provide less disclosure. Although
individual investors were less likely to trade in these filers immediately
following the IPO, they were not generally less likely to trade in these
specific firms. This suggests that there is no unique feature about these
firms that made them unappealing to individuals, helping to alleviate
concerns that our results are driven by an unobservable characteristic that
causes the firms to be unappealing to individual investors and to provide
reduced disclosure.

III.

IMPLICATIONS FOR LAWMAKERS AND COMMENTATORS

As noted in Part I, federal securities regulators are now engaged in a
vociferous debate over the optimal design of securities disclosure-and
the effects of that design on individual investor participation in modern
stock markets. Using the unique setting provided by the JOBS Act, we
have shown that reducing the quantum of information mandated by
securities law does indeed reduce individual investors' participation at the
IPO stage-but that this reduction disappears after just two weeks of
trading.
These findings have significant implications for regulators now
considering what changes, if any, to make to the mandatory disclosure
rules that comprise much of US securities law. In particular, our evidence
indicates that reducing the quantum of mandated disclosure at the IPO
stage-when individual investors are most likely to be sensitive to the risk
that large institutions are better-informed, and when complementary law
such as Regulation FD does not apply-raises the most acute concerns
related to individual investor participation. Thus, our evidence suggests
that-to the extent that securities regulators remain focused on individual
investors-there is a stronger case for changes to the mandatory disclosure
regime that applies to public companies after the IPO stage than before.
Second, our evidence suggests that lawmakers interested in
understanding the causal effects of changes to securities law on individual
investors should pursue more clearly identified experimental approaches
to future changes in the law. The JOBS Act worked a significant change to
the law of going public, providing an exceptional setting for studying the
effects of those changes. Notwithstanding our best efforts, however, as
noted above the nature of the change in the law makes it difficult to draw
clear causal inferences. Thus, lawmakers would do well to learn from the
limits of our study-as well as from its findings-in designing any future
changes to the law of mandatory disclosure.
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A. Mandatory Disclosure at the IPO Stage
To the extent that securities regulators are concerned about individual
investor participation in securities markets, our findings suggest that the
case for reducing disclosure mandates is weakest at the IPO stage, where
such investors are likely to be most sensitive to the informational effects
of reduced disclosures. Instead, for the reasons given below, lawmakers
seeking to reduce mandatory disclosure burdens might focus their efforts
after, rather than before, the IPO stage.
First, as a matter of both theory and evidence, individual investors are
likely to react far more strongly to a reduction in the quantum of
information required to be disclosed before the IPO stage than after. As to
theory, as noted in Part I, a significant benefit of mandatory disclosure for
individual investors is that such disclosure reduces information asymmetry
among classes of investors-or, in policy parlance, "levels the playing
field"-between individual and institutional investors. This asymmetry is
greatest at the IPO stage, when individual investors fear that the IPO
process has given the firm opportunities to convey nonpublic information
to institutional investors. Moreover, Regulation FD, which complements
mandatory disclosure rules with respect to information asymmetry among
investor classes,80 does not apply before the IPO stage. Thus, as a matter
of theory, reducing mandatory disclosure burdens at the IPO stage is far
more likely to result in a corresponding reduction in individual investor
participation than doing so after the IPO stage.81
As to evidence, we have shown in this Article that, in fact, reductions
in pre-IPO disclosure under the JOBS Act led to economically and
statistically significantly lower individual investor participation in IPOs.
Thus, whatever the benefits of the JOBS Act, for lawmakers concerned
about individual investor participation, the Act came with the cost of
reducing individuals' participation in initial public offerings. We have also
shown, however, that once these companies became public-and more
information about the firms became publicly available-this effect
disappeared. This finding suggests that reductions in mandated disclosures

80. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249).
81. We acknowledge, of course, that the number of shareholders affected by changes to the
mandatory disclosure rules that apply after the IPO is likely to be significantly greater than the number
of investors affected by changes to rules that apply before the IPO stage. We argue only that the
marginal effect of such changes is likely to be greater for individual investors at the IPO stage than for

firms that are already public, because investors can use alternative sources of information to assess
already-public companies that are not available for firms before an IPO.
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for post-IPO firms could have a much less pronounced effect on individual
investor participation in markets for those companies' stocks.
We note, of course, that policymakers' motivations for choosing the
pre-IPO stage for reductions in mandatory disclosure requirements likely
had little to do with the effects of those changes on individual investor
participation. Instead, those lawmakers cited a reduction in the costs of
going public for relatively small businesses-where these costs are often a
substantial fraction of the firm's budgets-as the basis for their choice to
focus on the pre-IPO disclosure regime.8 2 We note, however, that the early
evidence on whether the JOBS Act actually reduced those costs is rather
mixed.83 We also note that these costs can also be substantial on an
ongoing basis for small businesses that completed their IPO long before
the JOBS Act became law.84

Morever, while we certainly understand the political appeal of
reducing disclosure costs for firms that may soon go public,85 the evidence
we have presented in this Article suggests that lawmakers concerned about
individual investors should proceed with caution in this respect. By
reducing individual investors' participation in IPOs, the JOBS Act risks
creating the perception that the outsized returns occasionally available in
new issues are reserved only for large institutional shareholders. We do
not suggest that such a perception would be well-grounded in empirical
evidence-only that this perception might carry significant political
implications of its own. For lawmakers convinced that basic conceptions

82. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
83. See generally Chaplinksy et al., supra note 54.
84. See IPO TASK FORCE, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.

COMM'N, REBUILDING THE IPO ON-RAMP:

9 (2011),
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/rebuilding the ipo on-ramp.pdf (estimating $2.5 million in
costs for the IPO process and another $1.5 million in annual ongoing compliance costs of staying
PUTTING EMERGING COMPANIES AND THE JOB MARKET BACK ON THE ROAD TO GROWTH

public); see also Carlos Berdej6, Going Public After the JOBS Act, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 3 (2015)

(noting that the trend of decline in the number of private companies conducting IPOs "has been more
pronounced for small companies, reflecting the quasi-fixed nature of [regulatory] compliance costs,
which disproportionally burden smaller and younger issuers"). We acknowledge, of course, that some
disclosures will involve more "quasi-fixed" compliance costs than others. For example, a firm that
complies with SOX Section 404 at the IPO stage will have to implement the relevant infrastructure and
procedures at that point, incurring a substantial amount of such costs. Disclosures related to
governance or business decisions, on the other hand, typically involve fewer costs of this kind.
85. See, e.g., Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama to
Sign Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act (Apr. 5, 2012), available at https://www.white
house.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/05/president-obama-sign-jumpstart-our-business-startups-jobs-act
("The JOBS Act makes it easier for young, high-growth firms to go public by providing an incubator
period for a new class of 'Emerging Growth Companies.' During this period, qualifying companies
will have time to reach compliance with certain public company disclosure and auditing requirements
after their [IPO].").
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of fairness-or, more simply, sound politics-demand that individual
investors not be discouraged from participating in modern stock markets,
reducing the disclosure burdens that apply before an IPO may well be
more politically costly than making changes to the rules that apply after an
IPO.
For all of these reasons, our evidence suggests that policymakers
concerned about individual investor participation would do well to focus
future changes to the mandatory disclosure regime on disclosures
occurring after the IPO stage rather than before the company goes public.
As a matter of theory, changes to disclosure rules after the IPO stage are
less likely to reduce individual investor participation. As a matter of
empirical evidence, our results are consistent with that intuition. And as a
matter of political economy, such changes may allow lawmakers to
capture the benefits of reduced disclosure burdens without suffering the
corresponding costs related to 8reduced
levels of individual investor
6
participation in securities markets.
B. Experimental Design and Changes to Mandatory DisclosureLaw

Our evidence also suggests that, to the extent lawmakers do pursue
further changes to mandatory disclosure rules, they should do so in a
fashion that enables researchers to evaluate the effects of those changes on
the many groups of investors the SEC is charged with protecting.81 In this
respect, we join those scholars who have urged lawmakers to pursue
experimental regulatory changes that would allow researchers to more
clearly attribute causal effects of those changes for investors.88
As noted in Part I, the passage of the JOBS Act worked a significant
change in the disclosure rules that govern IPOs in the United States-a
significant category of transactions with broad importance for investors
and entrepreneurs alike. But identifying the causal effects of that change is

86. We note that, consistent with this argument, the SEC's extensive recent concept release on
modernizing public-company disclosures emphasizes changes to rules that apply after the IPO rather
than before. See Concept Release on Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K,
supra note 5, at 6 ("We focus this release on business and financial disclosures that registrants provide
in their periodic reports ....").
87. What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last

modified June 10, 2013) ("The laws and rules that govern the securities industry in the United States
derive from a simple and straightforward concept: all investors, whether large institutions or private

individuals, should have access to certain basic facts about an investment ...").
88. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Knowledge Problem (Harvard
Univ. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. and Bus., Discussion Paper No. 800, 2014), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin center/papers/pdf/Sunstein 800.pdf.
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elusive because the fashion in which the law was changed does not permit
clean causal inference.89 We have attempted to address this gap through
standard techniques in settings like these, but the limits of those
techniques are nontrivial. Like us, other researchers have attempted to
identify the causal implications of the JOBS Act for companies and
investors in other contexts. And, like us, these researchers have been
forced by the setting in which the Act became law to qualify the causal
implications of their findings. 90
We understand, of course, that a wide range of practical considerations
limit regulators' freedom to make changes to longstanding law in a fashion
that permits researchers to draw causal inference." But we note that
federal securities regulators are among the few lawmakers who have
executed randomized trials of the kind that would permit such inferences.92
As regulators consider whether to extend the JOBS Act's disclosurereduction reforms to other areas, we urge them to do so in a manner that
would permit clearer causal inference than is possible in the JOBS Act
setting. Such an approach would allow the SEC to assess more carefully
the effects of changing mandatory disclosure rules on the investors that it
is required by law to protect.
IV. CONCLUSION
A common justification for the mandatory disclosure rules that serve as
the bedrock of federal securities law is that such rules encourage
individual investors to participate in stock markets. Although the
desirability of individual investor participation in these markets has been
hotly debated, the Nation's top securities regulators have repeatedly made
clear that facilitating such participation is among their policy goals. Thus,
whether mandatory disclosure rules do, in fact, encourage individuals to
invest in stock markets remains a pressing question for lawmakers.

89. See, e.g., supra notes 75-77 (discussing selection effects necessarily associated with a study
in this setting, and attempting to address them through PSM).
90. See, e.g., Barth et al., supra note 55, at 24 (noting that consistency of results between linear-

regression tests and PSM "increase[s] [the authors'] confidence that the differences [they observe] are
attributable to the JOBS Act").
91. For an explanation of some of these limitations-and how they might be overcome-see
Sunstein, supra note 88, at 14-16.
92. The SEC famously pursued a natural-experiment approach to its implementation of
Regulation SHO, yielding research that could meaningfully evaluate the causal effects of stock market
dynamics on managerial choices. See, e.g., Yinghua Li & Liandong Zhang, Short Selling Pressure,
Stock Price Behavior, and Management Forecast Precision: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 53
J. AcCT.RES. 79 (2015).
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Empirical study of that question has been elusive, however, because few
settings allow researchers to examine the relationship between the scope of
mandatory disclosure rules and individuals' participation in the stock
market.
In this Article, we have provided rare empirical evidence on this
question by using the JOBS Act to study how individual investors respond
to specific reductions in mandated disclosures. Our results show that
individuals participate less in IPOs involving companies that provide
reduced disclosure-a finding consistent with the view that broader
disclosure mandates encourage small investors to participate in stock
markets. However, our results also show that the decrease in individual
trading disappears two weeks after a firm's IPO. This latter finding
suggests that there may be an effective economic substitute for the
information provided by mandatory disclosures: information provided by
the markets themselves when a firm's shares are publicly traded.
These findings have important implications for regulators now
considering whether and how to change the disclosure obligations that
public companies face under federal law. In particular, they suggest that
changes to these mandates after the IPO are likely to have far fewer effects
on individual investor participation than the changes imposed by the JOBS
Act. To the extent that lawmakers are concerned about such participation,
then, they would do well to focus on firms that are already public. In
particular, regulators could first focus those efforts on public companies
with significant alternative sources of information about the firm-sources
that could substitute for securities disclosures. But however the SEC
proceeds, it is critical that it does so in a fashion that will permit observers
to identify the effects of any regulatory changes on the investors that the
Commission is required by law to protect.
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APPENDIX

This appendix presents a number of robustness tests designed to
address concerns with the research design in our primary analysis. First,
because our control sample includes firms that went public prior to the
JOBS Act, we address the concern that our results were driven by
differences in individual trading or in the types of firms that held their
IPOs in the periods before and after the JOBS Act, rather than by the
reduced disclosures provided by EGCs. Second, we address the possibility
that our results were driven by the construction of our measure of
individual participation. Third, we address the concern that our results
were driven by modifications to the IPO process rather than by reductions
in disclosure.
I. SUITABILITY OF CONTROL SAMPLE

Our first set of robustness tests addressed several potential concerns
regarding our control sample. First, there could have been a difference in
trading by individual investors before and after the JOBS Act that was
completely unrelated to any changes in disclosure requirements. For
example, if individual investors were just generally less likely to trade
following the JOBS Act, this structural change could have driven our
findings. Second, there could have been a difference in the type of
companies that went public following the passage of the JOBS Act. The
JOBS Act was meant to lower the cost of raising capital, so its passage
might have encouraged a different type of company to go public. If so,
individuals may not have been interested in these new companies going
public.
A.

Changes in Individual Participation

We first addressed the possibility that, for reasons completely unrelated
to changes in disclosure, individual trading differed before and after the
JOBS Act. To rule out this possibility, we utilized the firms that provided
full disclosure even though they were EGC-eligible. Barring a structural
difference in individual trading across years, there should be no difference
between these firms and the firms used for the control sample.
Table VI shows the results of linear regression analysis comparing
these non-modified, EGC-eligible filers with the control sample. The
dependent variable is the percentage of total trading that is conducted by
individual investors, and the key variable of interest in this analysis is the
dummy variable Post, which is set to 1 for those firms that were EGC-
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eligible but did not modify their disclosures and to 0 for all control firms.
The regression includes all control variables used in the primary
analysis. 93 As before, standard errors are clustered by industry, and pvalues are reflected in parentheses below the regression coefficients.
TABLE VI: ROBUSTNESS TEST: EGC-ELIGIBLE FIRMS THAT DID NOT REDUCE
DISCLOSURE

(1)

(2)

-0.0 11
(0.903)

-0. M1
(0.408)

Control Variables
Industry & Underwriter Fixed Effects

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

R-squared
Num. Observations

0.39
189

0.3597
213

Post

The results show that individual trading for the non-modified filers and
the pre-JOBS Act control sample did not differ significantly. Column (1)
includes only those firms that held an IPO following April 5, 2012, and
did not modify their disclosures, and column (2) includes all those firms
that held an IPO following December 8, 2011, and did not modify their
disclosures (i.e., column (2) includes the firms to which the JOBS Act
applied retroactively). The lack of statistical significance indicates that our
results are not driven by a structural change in individual trading before
and after the JOBS Act.
B.

Structural Changes in the US IPO Market

We next consider whether our results were driven by a structural
change in the US IPO market. We analyzed this proposition from two
angles. First, we replaced the control sample used in our primary
analysis-firms that went public prior to the JOBS Act-with EGCeligible firms that did not reduce disclosure in any areas. Second, we
checked whether US exchanges have gained market share following the
JOBS Act.

93. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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1.

Alternative Control Sample

Table VII shows the results when we replaced the firms in our original
control sample with the non-modified filers that were EGC-eligible.
Assuming that these non-modified filers were similar to the pre-JOBS Act
control firms, we expected to find that these results are roughly
consistent
94
with the results of the linear regression shown in Table III.
TABLE VII: ROBUSTNESS TEST: EGC-ELIGIBLE FIRMs THAT DID NOT REDUCE
DISCLOSURE AS CONTROL

Panel A
(1)
Mlodiljed

Panel B
(2)

-0.0116:*0.
(t~S(0.()))

(1)
01 19

(1d
01036)
Control Variables
Industry & Underwriter Fixed
Effects
R-squared
Num. Observations

(2)

(1.00T):

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.3204
66

0.3219
66

0.2737
90

0.2786
90

Indeed, we found that our key results are consistent using these
alternative control groups. As in the prior table, the key variable in column
(1) is Modified, and the key variable in column (2) is Disclosure Index.
The sample in Panel A includes all non-modified, EGC-eligible firms that
held an IPO following April 5, 2012, and the sample in Panel B includes
all non-modified, EGC-eligible firms that held an IPO following
December 8, 2011. Because our findings are consistent when our control
group consists of firms that held an IPO during the same time period as the
treatment firms, we do not believe that our results were driven by a
structural change in the US IPO market.

94. With the exception of the control sample, all methodology is the same as that used in Table
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Relative Market Share of US Exchanges

Because we consider the London Stock Exchange ("LSE") to be the
closest competitor to US stock exchanges, we checked whether the US
exchanges have gained market share relative to the LSE since the passage
of the JOBS Act. Using the total number of foreign IPOs on US exchanges
and the LSE as the denominator, and the number of foreign IPOs on US
exchanges as the numerator, we checked whether there was an increase in
the percentage of foreign firms that held an IPO on a US exchange rather
than the LSE following the passage of the JOBS Act. If so, this could
indicate a change in the composition of IPO firms, suggesting that the
firms holding their IPOs after the JOBS Act may not be comparable to
those that held their IPO before the Act.
We found that the percentage was relatively constant, suggesting that
US exchanges did not gain market share relative to the LSE. While this is
a very broad analysis, we note that prior literature also has not found a
general increase in US IPO volume. 95 Overall, the combination of tests
provides us with confidence that our results are not driven by a change in
the type of firms that went public following the passage of the JOBS Act.
II. ALTERNATE MEASURES OF INDIVIDUAL INVESTMENT

Trading by individual investors is notoriously difficult to estimate, and
we had two potential concerns with our measure of individual trading.
First, the NYSE database containing the level of individual trading is
restricted to trades in equities listed on the NYSE; it omits trades that
occurred off-exchange or on other platforms. Second, because our measure
of individual trading was scaled by the total number of shares traded by
NYSE customers, our findings could have been driven by the denominator
rather than the numerator.
A.

Non-InstitutionalHoldingsfrom 13F Filings

Because our primary database captures only those individuals trading
on the NYSE, we supplemented our analysis with an additional proxy: the
level of non-institutional holdings based on Form 13F filings. Institutional

95. See Chaplinsky et al., supra note 54, at 33 ("Our finding that total IPO volume has not
increased after the Act is consistent with earlier noted studies .... ); see also Dambra et al., supra
note 58, at 126-34 (finding a slight increase in IPO volume, but that the increase was driven by firms
with high proprietary disclosure costs rather than general growth of all firms).
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investors who exercise discretion over $100 million or more of qualifying
assets are required to file Form 13F within forty-five days of the end of
each calendar quarter. 96 In order to calculate the percentage of noninstitutional holdings for each stock, we subtracted the total institutional
holdings from the total shares outstanding. 97 We then scaled the level of
non-institutional holdings by total shares outstanding to get a percentage.
Using this broader proxy of non-institutional ownership, we replicated the
analyses presented in Table III. The results are reported in Table VIII. 98
TABLE

VIII:

ROBUSTNESS TEST: NON-INSTITUTIONAL HOLDINGS

Model

Model

(1)

(2)

-0960 *:

Mlodifiej

0.004)

Judex(0.022)
Control Variables
Industry & Underwriter Fixed Effects
R-squared
Num. Observations

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

0.3278
829

0.326
829

The magnitude using the 13F filings was far greater than that reported
using the NYSE data, but the results from the two measures consistently
showed that individual investors were less likely to participate in firms
with reduced disclosures. We note, however, that the larger magnitude
associated with the 13F filings is not unexpected. First, the percentage of
non-institutional holdings includes both institutional investors that were
too small to file a 13F and individual investors, so it is far more inclusive
than the NYSE dataset. Second, the NYSE data report trading, whereas the
13F filings report holdings. Individual investors are thought to hold shares
for a much longer duration than institutional investors, 99 so we expect

96. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f)(1) (2014).
97. For this calculation, we only include common stock, and we clean the data following
Campbell et al., supra note 68, at 69-71.
98. In an untabulated analysis, we also replicate Table IV by using the propensity score analysis
presented in Table III to create a matched sample. When we compare the percentage of noninstitutional holdings across the matched and control samples, the results are consistent with our earlier
findings, and are therefore statistically significant.
99. Compare Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odeon, Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The
Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors, 55 J. FIN. 773 (2000) (finding that the
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individuals to have a relatively higher holdings-to-trading ratio at the end
of each fiscal quarter.
B.

Alternate Scalarfor NYSE Data

The second robustness check related to our measure of individual
trading addressed the concern that our findings were caused by a scalar
effect. Because the deflator in our primary analysis is the total volume
traded on the NYSE, it is possible that differences in the total volume
traded before and after the JOBS Act may be driving our findings. To
address this possibility, we deflated total individual investment at the end
of the day by total common shares outstanding rather than total trading
volume, and replicated all the estimations in Tables III-VIII using this
alternative measure. Although statistical significance decreased in some
estimations, the results presented in our original analyses were all
directionally consistent and maintained statistical significance at 10% or
better. For concision, these results are not tabulated.
III. MODIFICATIONS THAT WERE NOT DISCLOSURE RELATED
The JOBS Act allows EGCs to make a number of modifications to the
IPO process, some of which are not disclosure related, so it is possible that
individual investors responded to the modifications in the IPO process
rather than to the reduced level of disclosure. Other literature on the JOBS
Act, which has generally considered all major modifications rather than
only those that are disclosure related, has found that these non-disclosure
modifications are related to an increase in indirect IPO costs.10 0 However,
while these modifications may affect other outcomes, they do not provide
investors with less information. Thus, we did not expect them to be related
to individual participation, so we expected the inclusion of these items to
lessen the statistical and economic significance of the DI.
The two additional modifications we considered were the following:
(1) did the filer elect to freeze the generally accepted accounting principles
("GAAP") in use at the time of the IPO?; and (2) did the firm opt out of

annual turnover rate at a US-based brokerage firm is roughly 75% annually, which suggests that
individuals have an average holding period of sixteen months), with BEN W. HEINEMAN, JR. &
STEPHEN DAVIS, YALE SCH. OF MGMT., ARE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS PART OF THE PROBLEM OR
PART OF THE SOLUTION? KEY DESCRIPTIVE AND PRESCRIPTIVE QUESTIONS ABOUT SHAREHOLDERS'

ROLE IN U.S. PUBLIC EQUITY MARKETS 9 (2011) (reporting that in 2009, equity-based mutual funds, a
common type of institutional investor, had an average holding period of less than eleven months).
100. See Barth et al., supra note 55; see also Chaplinsky et al., supra note 54.
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the Say-on-Pay and Say-on-Frequency provisions required by federal
law?1 °1 If the filer elected to freeze GAAP, it would not have to comply
with changes to GAAP unless the changes also applied to nonpublic
companies. If the filer elected out of the Say-on-Pay and Say-onFrequency provisions, the filer would not have to allow the shareholders to
vote on executive compensation.
Although we would have liked to test these modifications individually,
we were unable to do so because there is substantial overlap between the
firms that elected to use these modifications and the firms that provided
reduced disclosures. Instead, we added these modifications to the DI to
create a Modified Disclosure Index, so that the Modified Disclosure Index

included all six modifications rather than only the four disclosure
provisions. We then replicated the analysis described in Table III using
this Modified Disclosure Index.
TABLE

IX:

ROBUSTNESS TEST: TOTAL MODIFICATIONS

Model
(1)

Model
(2)

-0.0 11
t~islosre
Tdex(0.000)

_OQO35T:*
(0.007)

M\odified Ji1de\
Control Variables

Yes

Yes

Industry & Underwriter Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

0.3379

0.3381

218

218

R-squared

Num. Observations

The results presented in Table IX show that the economic and

statistical significance of our original findings were reduced when these
additional variables were included. This finding, which is consistent with
the conclusion that inclusion of these non-disclosure modifications
"waters down" the predictive power of our original DI, suggests that
individual investors responded to the reduced disclosure specifically rather
than the overall number of modifications.

101.

See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,

§ 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010).

